THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
FROM TRUST TO DISTRUST
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1890 enacted legislation' intended to ensure for this
nation a competitive economy. Thereafter it proceeded from
time to time to enact supplemental legislation 2 paying at least lip
3
service to this objective. The resulting statutes, popularly termed "antitrust laws,"' 4 in most instances stated in general language the controlling
legal principles, and in substance thereby added to the other duties of our
judiciary the administrative task of applying those principles to our complex industrial society.
The courts by the early 1900's, in administering these antitrust laws,
succeeded in formulating from the common law heritage of this legislation
a rule of reason'-flexible, realistic and commendably practical. The judiciary properly shrank from forcing all industry to fit precisely into any
rigid, unvarying procrustean bed. Subsequently, as new antitrust laws
were enacted, such as the Clayton Act, this rule of reason was at least for
a while extended to apply to these new statutory commands. 6 The courts
in this manner considered the abstract legislative generalities of Congress
and one by one effectively breathed life into them, and "it was good."
The most perfect creations of man, however, whether in the form of a
constitution, a statute or an automobile, must still be administered by
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Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
2 See, e.g., 28 Stat. 509 (1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 8 (1951) (Wilson Tariff Act); 38
Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1951) (Clayton Act); 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1951) (Federal Trade Commission Act).
3There is some dispute as to whether a competitive objective was sought after in such
subsequent legislation as the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1 (1951) and the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 13 (1951).
4 The Congressional definition of "antitrust laws" excludes from this term legislation such
as the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1951).
5Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C.A. 6th,
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
6 Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81,
86,87 (C.A. 3d, 1922), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
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man; which is to say that they must inevitably reflect the frailties of their
mortal creators. The antitrust laws, accordingly, in their impact upon industry, necessarily thereafter proceeded to reflect over the succeeding
years the current beliefs and disbeliefs of their judicial administrators.
The business community by degrees came to learn, to its dismay, that the
legislative rules of competition were much like the laws of the Medes and
Persians-they altered not in form but varied greatly in application when
Cyrus was succeeded by Darius.
Today, these truths should be self-evident to all who advise or participate in industry: Congress by its antitrust enactments merely proposes; it
is the Supreme Court which disposes. Depending upon the personnel of
our courts, the corporate virtues of yesterday may be business risks today
and a criminal offense 7 tomorrow. Corporate management which solely
looks for guidance from past antitrust rulings invites painful disillusionment in the future. He who runs even briefly over the course taken by our
antitrust laws can readily read these truths and arrive at these conclusions. "Let us look at the record."
THE OLD FAITH

The judicial administrators of our antitrust laws, in the days of our
fathers, were ardent converts to a great and abiding faith, namely, faith in
business. An initial decade of trial and error in construing these laws had
persuaded our courts that he governs best who governs industry least.
Our nation in those years was experiencing an unparalleled industrial
growth. The tremendous contributions of business initiative in building up
our ever-expanding economy were physically present on all sides. It behooved the public, the prosecutor, and even the courts, to walk humbly in
the presence of the nation's benefactors. The decisions of yesterday
abounded, accordingly, with repeated reaffirmations of this profound
faith of our fathers in business and in businessmen.
On the one hand, business was assured by our courts that it was entitled
to substantial freedom of action in making its competitive decisions:
Effective competition requires that traders have large freedom of action when conducting their own affairs. Success alone does not show reprehensible methods, although
it may increase or render insuperable the difficulties which rivals must face.8

True, the courts realized, competition might be restrained by business,
if given such freedom of action; but, after all, restraint was inevitable in

any form of commercial transaction:
7 See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
8 FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568, 582 (1923).
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But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essenceY
Business was even assured great freedom in entering into agreements
with competitors:
The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial... they do not seek
to establish a mere delusive liberty either by making impossible the normal and fair
expansion of that commerce or the adoption of reasonable measures to protect it from
injurious and destructive practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis....
Realities must dominate the judgment. The mere fact that the parties to an agreement
eliminate competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it. °
On the other hand, governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission were sternly warned by the courts to refrain from amateurish
-.administrative interference with commercial matters:
The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no general authority
to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods
or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage
called competition .... [it is essential that those who adventure their time, skill and
capital should have large freedom of action in the conduct of their own affairs. 1'
Federal Trade Commissioners were warned that their functions were
strictly limited to the tracking down of predatory and monopolistic practices:
It was never intended by Congress that the Trade Commission would have the duty
and power to judge what is too fast a pace for merchants to proceed in business and to
compel them to slow up. To do so would be to destroy all competition except that
which is easy.n
Even governmental investigators of industry were required to proceed
modestly and with an appropriate appreciation of the deference due to
business:
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be
loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies
to sweep all our traditions into the fire.., and to direct fishing expeditions into
private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.' 3
Above all, the courts in administering our antitrust laws insisted that
where businessmen were on trial they were to be regarded as innocent
until clear evidence to the contrary was produced. Thus a mere showing
9

Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
10 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
U FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923).
12National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733, 739 (C.A. 2d, 1924).
13 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-306 (1924).
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that competitors in an industry tended to follow the price changes of one
of their number was considered to prove little or nothing:
And the fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment,
to follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of
14
competition or show any sinister domination.

The realistic observation was made that:
Grocers, butchers, and all other lines in the same markets generally sell the same things
at the same prices, for the sound reasons that they wish to get all they can, that they
cannot get more than the price at which the bulk of what is sold in their respective
markets is selling, and that they do not think it wise to cut prices.' 5

Governmental efforts to win litigation, not by unequivocal evidence
but on the basis of circumstantial deductions made by expert witnesses
from general industrial data, were scathingly denounced:
It has become an aphorism that there is danger of deception in generalities, and in a
case of this importance we should have something surer for judgment than speculation, something more than a deduction equivocal of itself even though the facts it
rests on or asserts were not contradicted. If the phenomena of production and prices
were as easily resolved as the witness implied, much discussion and much literature
have been wasted, and some of the problems that are now distracting the world would
0
be given composing solution.1

TaE OLD RULES

A corporation in the days of our fathers, by reason of this judicial deference to business, was relatively untroubled by the antitrust laws. It was
free to act on the assumption that what it did would be considered to be
mere good, clean fun so long as it abstained from conduct of the nature
proscribed by the pulpit. If it roughed up a competitor, it was able to
count on receiving no more than a judicial reprimand, with an understanding aside that boys would be boys. This golden age of faith in business indeed reached a point where judicial trust in effect endorsed industrial trusts. Combinations of as much as seventy and eighty percent of
an industry were said to be unobjectionable. 7 Whatever was, in industry,
was right.
Corporate management, to the slight degree it bothered to consider the
antitrust laws at all, found the then current rules of the competitive game
to be roughly as follows:
14 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-709 (1927).
15United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 47 F. 2d 288, 316-17 (E.D. Mo., 1931)
IsUnited States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417,448-49 (1920).
17 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499 (N.D. Ill., 1916),
appeal dismissed, 253 U.S. 499 (1920).
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Selection of customers. The corporation, if acting independently of others,
might deal or not deal with whom it pleased. Thus it could refuse to sell to
price cutters. 8 It might decline to buy from one who sold to competitors.' 9
The government had no right to select its business customers. 2 The law
was dear:
It is the right, "long-recognized," of a trader engaged in an entirely private business,
"freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal."21
Quotation of prices. The corporation enjoyed wide latitude in its pricing. It might follow the prices of a competitor,2 2 utilize industry basing
points2 ' and sell at any level it pleased-even below cost.24 One court summarized the law as follows:
It is settled law that a trader or manufacturer engaged in private business, not of a
public or quasi public character, may sell to whom he pleases, may charge different
prices for the same article to different individuals, and may make such discrimination
in his business as he chooses."
Method of distribution. In the absence of monopolization, a businessman
might individually select any of the customary channels and forms for distributing goods. He could sell to independent merchants, require exclusive
2
dealing of them,28 and promise in return to sell only to one in any area. 1
On the other hand, he might sell only through agents.2 8 Even certain restrictions on use and resale were permissible.2 1 It was said of the Sherman
Act that
" United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
19FTC v. Raymond Bros. Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
20 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C.A. 2d, 1915).
2 FTC v. Raymond Bros. Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 573 (1924).
2United

States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).

3Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307 (C.A. 7th, 1919).
Fosburgh v. Calif. & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co., 291 Fed. 29,36 (C.A. 9th, 1923). The
right to discriminate was qualified to some degree, of course, by Section 2 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1951), but this statute in its then form caused relatively
little trouble.
"D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915). The right to
require exclusive dealing was also qualified to some extent by Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
ibid., at § 14, but only if carried too far.
" United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 697 (1927); cf. Moore v. N.Y. Cotton
Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
28 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
20Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 594-97 (1925); P. Lorillard
Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D. N.Y., 1922).
'4

2
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the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to
further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise,
to accomplish such purpose. 30

Licensing of patents. The corporate owner of a patent was viewed by the
courts as the lawful owner of a monopoly. It was entitled to grant exclusive licenses, 31 restrict the prices at which its licensees sold,32 and, if it so
desired, condition the license of one patent upon the acceptance of a
license under another.3 3 The essential value of a patent was said to be in
its power to restrain:
Of course, there is restraint in a patent. Its strength is in the restraint, the right to
exclude others from the use of the invention, absolutely or on the terms the patentee
chooses to impose. This strength is the compensation which the law grants for the
exercise of invention. Its exertion within the field covered by the patent law is not an
34
offense against the Anti-Trust Act.
Agreements with competitors. The corporation of yesterday was given wide
latitude not only to act for itself, but also to engage in joint efforts with
competitors to improve trade conditions. In the absence of conduct readily identified as boycott and the like, companies were permitted to ex37
36
change statistics,35 utilize joint agencies, fix prices for limited periods,
38
and in exceptional cases agree upon undisguised industry quotas. Businessmen were informed that they were better equipped to cure trade evils
than the law:

Voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competitive opportunities in the
public interest may be more effective than legal processes. And cooperative endeavor
may appropriately have wider objectives than merely the removal of evils which are
infractions of positive law. Nor does the fact that the correction of abuses may tend
to stabilize a business, or to produce fairer price levels, require that abuses should
go uncorrected. 39
Foreigncommerce. The hardy corporation which had ventured into foreign
trade was given practically a free hand in the absence of clear monopolization affecting this country. Joint ownership by American companies of a
30 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
3'Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913).
"2United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
33 Cf. FTC v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. 2d 152 (C.A. 2d, 1932).
34 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 57 (1918).
'1 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
36Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
37 Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
"INat'l Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
39 Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936).
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foreign subsidiary was approved;40 international patent agreements with
territorial restrictions were upheld; 41 and even outright monopolization
was in one instance left undisturbed where the acts of the American company were solely performed abroad.4 2 The courts ruled that our nationals
were entitled to use whatever methods were necessary to conduct foreign
trade:
To hold otherwise would be, practically and commercially, to enjoin the steel trade
of the United States from using the business methods which are necessary in order to
build up and maintain a dependable business abroad, and if the Sherman Law were so
43
construed, it would itself be a restraint of trade.
Over-all size. Finally, the corporation of yesterday was assured that there
was no limit to the size to which it might lawfully grow, provided it
44
utilized only lawful means in the process. Size was held to be no offense.
Vertical integration was viewed as affirmatively promoting the public
interest. 45 An acquisition of the stock of competitors had to restrain trade
substantially before it could be subjected to challenge even under Section
7 of the Clayton Act.46 The mutual affection of courts and businessmen
was touchingly manifest in rulings such as the following:
It is said that from seventy to eighty per cent. of all the shoe machinery business was
put into a single hand ... taking it as true we can see no greater objection to one
corporation manufacturing seventy per cent. of three non-competing groups of patented machines collectively used for making a single product than to three corporations making the same proportion of one group each. The disintegration aimed at by
the statute does not extend to reducing all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest
4
degree.
THE NEw FAITH

Some faiths fall upon ground which permits immediate and rapid
growth but which subsequently fails to sustain such faith when subjected
40United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E.D.Pa., 1915), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921).
41
Thorns v. Sutherland, 52 F. 2d 592 (C.A. 3d, 1931).
42

American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); but cf. United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
4SUnited States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55, 114 (D.C.N.J., 1915), aff'd, 251 U.S. 417
(1920).
44
United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. Quaker Oats
Co., 232 Fed. 499 (N.D.I1l., 1916).
45United States v. U.S. Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F. 2d 678 (C.A. 4th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 757 (1927).
4
6 Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
47
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217 (1913).
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to adversity. The Great Depression came in 1929 to test the apparently
deep and abiding faith of the judiciary in business. Investors lost their savings; employees lost their jobs; and businessmen lost their standing of first
in the hearts of their countrymen. In their distress, all eyes were raised to
Washington.
A new competing faith then was born-the Cult of Washington-to
challenge the Cult of Business. The national creed of this new faith was
"In Government We Trust." Its missionaries were zealous government
office holders eager to spread the new theology to all voters. And this Cult
of Washington grew and prospered. The emergency of the depression was
succeeded by the emergency of war; this in turn was followed by the crises
of the cold war and Korea; and continuous injections of government controls into the blood streams of business over, this period became habitforming. The abnormal became the normal order of the day. Government
rather than business seemed to perform the miracle of providing food to
feed the thousands.
The new faith in government, under these circumstances, won judicial
converts as well as much of the general public. Right thinking towards
Washington, moreover, became the straight and narrow path to judicial
appointment and advancement. In due course, accordingly, the courts
commenced to argue that government, rather than business, was the
omnipotent repository of superior wisdom to whom all should defer. The
FTC, for example, was said to be an agency created by Congress
whose membership would at all times be experienced, so that its conclusions would be
the result of an expertness coming from experience.... [C]ourts should not lightly48
modify the Commission's orders made in efforts to safeguard a competitive economy.

Solicitous precautions were taken by the courts to ensure that government agencies were not handicapped in suing business through any disturbing necessity for proving their case, if there was any reasonable possibility that the governmental experts might be right:
the Commission is authorized by the Act to bar discriminatory prices upon the
"reasonable possibility" that different prices for like goods to competing purchasers
may have the defined effect on competition.... It would greatly handicap effective
enforcement of the Act to require testimony to show that which we believe to be selfevident, namely, that there is a "reasonable possibility" that competition may be adversely affected by a practice under which manufacturers and producers sell their
goods to some customers 49substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers.
48

FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720, 726 (1948).

49 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47, 50 (1948).
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Facts which heretofore had been viewed by the courts as proving nothing by themselves, such as an identity of price quoted by two competitors,
were now viewed as sufficient without more to sustain government charges:
a customer located in St. Paul could purchase cans at the same delivered price irrespective of whether the purchase was made from a member located in Chicago or St.
Paul. Just how such an unnatural situation could be brought about by members of an
industry without a plan or agreement is difficult, if not impossible, to visualize. 0

The new faith in government inevitably drove from judicial minds their
faith in business. The attitude of the courts toward industry commenced
to range from disinterested impartiality to pronounced coolness. Trust in
a successful large business rapidly turned into undisguised distrust. Its

executives would not be believed on the stand if contradicted by writings
of the past:
Where such testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous documents we can give it
little weight.6'

Industry's cardinal virtue of private initiative now was pronounced an
unlawful method of excluding competition, if exercised successfully:
It [defendant] insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened,
and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.Even minority opinions, when endorsing a conclusion favorable to a
defendant company, took care to disavow kindly feelings toward the
structure of American industry:
big business has become bigger and bigger. Monopoly has flourished. Cartels have increased their hold on the nation. The trusts wax strong. There is less and less place for
the independent. 3
The effect of this changed approach of the courts towards government
and business was most dramatically reflected in judicial rulings which
more and more curtailed the rights of business to defend itself when on
trial. Industry was no longer permitted to show that trade practices under

attack had had little restraining effect upon competition if the volume of
business involved was not insignificant:
it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market....
affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant
The volume of business
54
or insubstantial.
50

Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F. 2d 478,481 (C.A. 7th, 1946).
51United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,396 (1948).
52
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 416,431 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
53Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949).
1Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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Nor was business allowed to prove that trade practices were adopted
for the purpose and with the effect of safeguarding industry from uneconomic and tortuous practices:
even if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of every state, that situation
would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain interstate
commerce in violation of federal law.n
Indeed, conspiracy charges brought against industrial defendants came
to be sustained by such inadequate proof as to call forth the comment in a
dissenting opinion in a non-antitrust case that
a conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that
conspiracy existed."
THE NEW RULiEs
The corporation of today, by reason of this change in the courts from an
attitude of trust to one at times approaching distrust, can no longer be indifferent to the antitrust laws. Failure to be alive to those laws may be
penalized by divestiture of the right to live under those laws. One by one
the old rules of competition are being subjected to judicial scrutiny, and
many after trial are being found wanting. There is nothing so stale as yesterday's opinion in many phases of antitrust law. Our Supreme Court at
times seems to pattern its approach to old antitrust opinions much like
Mark Twain's New England weather. If you don't like it, wait a minute.
Corporate management, under these circumstances, can be sure of nothing. A principle of law may be here today and gone tomorrow. Many of the
old rules are still valid-but which ones, that is the question. Under these
circumstances the writer has elsewhere advised eight rough rules of thumb
for dealing on a strictly day to day basis with industry's problems.5 7 As of
the date of this paper, the following changes in the old principles of competition seem to have occurred:
Selection of customers. A corporation, even if acting independently of
others, in some limited areas has no longer any unqualified right to deal or
not to deal with others. A corporation selling through two'subsidiaries has
been denied the right to refuse to sell to a customer who flouted its request
to hold prices down."8 A manufacturer of a unique linen rug has been condemned for cutting off a dealer who sold to a direct customer of the manuFashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
56Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
56

67 See Van Cise, The Antitrust Laws from the Point of View of a Private Practitioner
(Practising Law Inst. Monog., 1949).
58 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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facturer.59 A news agency found neither to .monopolize nor to dominate
has been required to serve competitors of its subscribing members.60 How
far the right of a seller to select his customers has now been qualified by
the courts is not known; but it is significant that a company doing a small
percentage of the available business of an industry was recently held to be
"boycotting" where it sought to deal only with those quoting better prices
to it than to its competitors.
When A&P did not get the preferential discount or allowance it demanded, it did not
simply exercise its right to refuse to contract with the supplier. It went further and
served notice on the supplier that if that supplier did not meet the price dictated by
A&P, not only would the supplier lose the business at the moment under negotiation,
but it would be put upon the unsatisfactory list or private blacklist of A&P and could
expect no more business from the latter. This was a boycott and in and of itself is a
violation of the Sherman Act. 1
Quotation of prices. A corporation can be sure today of only one rule in

pricing, namely, that whatever it does will entail risks. If it quotes the
same price as its competitors, it will be in danger of a charge of conspiracy.62 If it quotes this same price generally, as it must in a competitive
market, but varies it in specific instances in order to get new business and
prove the absence of conspiracy, it will face a charge of discrimination. 3
It will find two recent decisions denying that all basing point pricing is
unlawful, 6" and a still later opinion by the same Court ruling that
the combined effect of the two 6cases
was to forbid the adoption for sales purposes of
5
any basing point price system.

Methods of distribution.A modem corporation must today exercise great
care in determining how to distribute its goods. It may invite trouble if it
sells its products to retailers who agree to deal exclusively in its products. 66
If it sells directly to consumers through agents67 or vertically-integrated
69 United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Minn., 1945).
60Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); also cf. Lorain journal Co. v.
United States, 72 S.Ct. 181 (1951).
61United States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79,87 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
12Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (C.A. 7th, 1948), aff'd sub nom.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
63 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
"FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S.
726 (1945).
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 723 (1948).
Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
67 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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outlets," it must keep in mind new rulings qualifying its freedom to do so.
Moreover, new law may be in the making that its terms to its customers,
even when not pricing terms, must in some instance be uniform, on the
theory that:
Each discriminatory contract constituted a conspiracy. 9
Licensing of patents. The corporate owner of a patent in particular is currently bothered and bewildered. The courts now seldom talk of a patentee's right to which the public faith is pledged."0 The patentee instead is
said to have a privilege conditioned by a public purpose.7' He may safely
own and license rights under large groups of patents if he licenses all
on substantially nondiscriminatory terms,7 2 but he should avoid imposing
price7 3 and comparable restraints 74 upon its licensees. How many former
rights a patentee retains is a secret known, if at all, only to Washington.
This alone can safely be asserted: few judicial tears are being shed over the
practical problems of a licensor in figuring out a lawful way to obtain a
reasonable return on his patented invention:
It is without significance that, as petitioner contends, it is not practicable to exploit
7
the patent rights by granting licenses.
Agreements with competitors.The corporation of today is not yet debarred
from all intercourse with its competitors. Once it starts to cross over to its
competitor's side of the street, however, it finds the safety zone to be exceedingly narrow and well policed. Trade associations are viewed with disfavor, to the extent that the Supreme Court on its own motion has ordered
dissolved a trade association appealing to it for relief.7" Trade evils apparently may now be corrected only by government if they affect prices 77 or
involve disciplinary measures.7 s Even simultaneous identity of action on
nonprice matters by competitors is questioned.7 9 Business and labor are
equally suspect in this phase of the law:
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violations of antitrust laws could not be defended on the ground that a particular
accused combination would not injure but would actually help manufacturers, laborers,
retailers, consumers, or the public in general."'
Foreign commerce. The corporation that ventures beyond our shores, instead of being given every encouragement from home, now is able to
count on being shot at from both sides of the water. If it licenses patents
and trade marks, it may not even agree to the territorial covenants required by trade mark law. 8 1 If it is forced to make a deal with a cartel as
the price of being able to do export business, it must abstain and withdraw
from business. 8 2 Agreements per se unlawful in interstate commerce have
been said to be equally unlawful in foreign commerce. 3 Congress proposed
in its Webb Act to give exporters greater freedom abroad, but the courts
have summarily disposed of much of this illusory freedom. 4 When defendants have pointed out that commodities cannot readily be exported
today, making necessary foreign investments in lieu thereof, the answer
has been given that the antitrust laws and the courts know better:
This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints
of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and
import trade in commodities is both possible and desirable.8
Over-all size. Finally, the corporation of today is discouraged in every possible way from expanding its activities. Size is now castigated as an earmark of monopoly power.86 Growth through acquisition,87 the leverage of
vertical 8 or horizontal 9 integration, or even foresighted initiative" can in
some situations be unlawful. Business size of sufficient magnitude to represent power to exclude competitors from the market is termed monopoly
power.9 ' At all times a sincere and zealous minority of the Supreme Court
80Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 496 (1949).

81Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
82 United
8

States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).

3 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

84 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. Mass., 1950);
United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F.Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y., 1949).
8
1Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597 (1951).
86 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
87 See the provisions of the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1951).
88 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
89 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
90United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
01 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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appears to approach business problems with the objective of ensuring that
power alone resides with the government. Nowhere has this firmly held
objective been more candidly outlined than in the following extract from a
recent famous dissenting opinion:
Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so
that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the
political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact
that they are not vicious men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant. That is
the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of
hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great that only a government of the people should have it.9

THE FUTURE RULES
The true shape of things to come has not, of course, as yet emerged.
The future seldom reveals itself with precise clarity to the present. The
general pattern of tomorrow's rules for business being currently developed
under the influence of the Cult of Washington, however, is all too apparent
from the above analysis.
The underlying premise of these new rules for business is one of distrust
towards industry. Businessmen are believed continuously to be conspiring
to build industrial structures giving to their owners powers which should
be held only by government, much as the plainsmen of ancient times
sought to erect a high tower reaching unto heavenly mansions reserved to
the gods. The first commandment of at least a minority of our judiciary,
accordingly, is that such industrial structures should, like the tower of
93
Shinar, be destroyed, and their builders scattered.
The other new rules for business currently being developed face up to
those situations wherein for some reason a Babelonian destruction of industrial structures would be impractical or impolitic. In such cases it is
reluctantly concluded that these industrial structures may be retained in
form, but it is carefully provided that they must be so subjected to regulation as to effectively destroy their powers in substance. Business should
deal not with those with whom it wishes to deal but with those with whom
the government wishes it to deal. 94 It should buy, sell and license on a
nondiscriminatory, nonrestrictive basis.9 5 Aggressive solicitation of new
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business opportunities should be barred if the company is unduly successful; instead industry should wait for business to be thrust upon it.9" Finally, self-regulation of industry should be so completely proscribed as to
make government regulation alone the vehicle for eliminating trade
evils.9 7 In short, these supplemental rules for competition would seem to be
patterned upon the rules of industry where business is the barely tolerated
ward of the government and competition is superseded with regulation,
namely, the public utility.
This developing pattern of ruin or rule of business, needless to say, is
foreign to our previous antitrust traditions. The antitrust laws, unlike the
Koran, have not heretofore been thought to authorize a grim Islamic choice
to business of either being cut into small helpless pieces or of submitting to
the rule of the true believers. Senator Sherman presumably would have
been surprised, and possibly annoyed, had anyone accused him in 1890 of
sponsoring legislation to give to government any such sweeping powers of
life, death and regulation over private business. Certainly the use of our
antitrust laws to justify imposing public utility regulation upon private
industry is novel.
Towards public businesses the approach is regimentation. With their accepted inherent characteristics of "monopoly," the public imposes obligations of affirmative
action upon those who engage in such "public" businesses. They must serve all, with
adequate facilities, without discrimination, at a reasonable price and for so long as
the public needs their service. This the public more and more backs up with a meticulous regimentation of their conduct by regulatory bodies so as to get from these businesses what it feels it requires. In turn the public confers on these businesses certain
correlative rights and security.
On the other hand, to the "private" businesses the fundamental approach is "freedom." We expect to get from them the benefit of increasing productivity and consequently the possibility of a rising general standard of living and results in the production and exchange of products and services of a character and on terms ordinarily
reasonably satisfactory to both buyer and seller. We expect these results ordinarily to
flow reasonably automatically from the play of initiative and dynamic urge of selfinterest in both buyer and seller and the spur and rein of competitive influences on
the minds of both. We know this free play in "private" businesses involves inevitable
wastes and duplication of efforts and facilities. We know it will never work perfectly.
There will often be inefficiencies, losses and hardships. But we are disposed to take all
this as part of the price we are prepared to pay for freedom and its dynamic urges.9 8
96See "Over-all size," supra at 680.
0 See "Agreements with competitors," supra at 679.
98 Letter of Transmittal and Memorandum for the President's Committee on Business and
Government Relations,-Submitted by a Special Committee of the Section on Anti-Trust Law
of the New York State Bar Association (1950), pp. i-ii.
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It is possible, of course, that the courts may eventually recoil from the
extremes to which the Cult of Washington is currently taking them.
This developing pattern of the sword or the yoke for industry is not as
yet the law of the land, and we may still hope that it may never be. On
the one hand, there have been recent indications that faith in business is
not completely dead, even in judicial circles. Small may be the regard of
many towards industry, but there are still some who profess to love it.
On the other hand, faith in government is currently being reappraised
downward by many as the result of disillusioning developments at home
and abroad. The discovery may eventually be made that trust in business
is not necessarily inconsistent with trust in government, that each with its
virtues and failings is essential in a free, competitive society, and that rules
compatible with the interests of business and government are both possible and desirable. Why either business or government should claim infallibility is a mystery understood only by its devotees, as each in the last
analysis is merely a corporate fiction describing an aggregation of fallible
human beings.

